The conventional wisdom in Washington is that a world full of democratic regimes is more likely to be friendly to American interests. This logic gave rise to the popular theory of regime change that inspired the US operations in Grenada, Panama, and post-World War II Japan and Germany – as well as many other such interventions throughout the decades that followed.
However, a closer examination of the evidence shows that regime change is more often an expensive failure than a success. Rather than encouraging democracy and advancing America’s security, it tends to foster instability, fuel regional conflict, and empower factions that are more hostile to the United States than the previous government.
To do regime change right, it requires serious planning and a population in the target country ready to embrace the process. Without both of those conditions, regime change is likely to spiral into a lengthy state-building project that does not achieve the original goals. The US experience in bringing down dictators like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, as well as the more recent “color revolutions” of Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and other countries, is a dismal record of failure.
The lesson here is not to give up on trying to promote democracy and improve human rights around the globe, but rather to recognize that regime change, by its nature, is a costly tool that often backfires. American officials should consider shifting two common mindsets before advocating for this type of intervention again:
About the Author
